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I. OPENING PLAY: INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Samantar v. Yousuf that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") does not govern the
application or determination of foreign official immunity.' Instead, the
Court found that the immunity of foreign officials was "properly
governed by the common law." 2 While the Court failed to explicitly
define these common-law principles, it did note that the State
Department would play a role in individual official immunity
determinations. 3 In the years since, the State Department has done
just that. Through officially submitted Suggestions of Immunity and
Statements of Interest, the State Department has rejuvenated its
standards for granting foreign official immunity for both heads of
state and current and former officials. These standards draw upon the
foundational principles of customary international law for official
immunity and establish the criteria by which officials are entitled to
such immunity in the United States.
Nevertheless, this area of law is still fairly undeveloped. Courts
struggle over questions of foreign official immunity and the
appropriate amount of deference to give the State Department. This
Note seeks to alleviate this ambiguity by demonstrating that the State
Department's post-Samantar Suggestions of Immunity and
Statements of Interest reveal a consistent and reliable framework for
determining whether a foreign official is immune from suit. Courts
should defer to the State Department's application of this framework
and apply it themselves in the face of State Department silence.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II explains the dichotomy
between status-based and conduct-based official immunity as well as a
brief history of foreign sovereign immunity practice in the United
1. 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010).
2. Id. at 325.
3. Id. at 323.
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States through the Samantar decision. Part III discusses the evolution
of the Samantar litigation through the Supreme Court ruling and
further developments on remand.4 In addition, Part III also discusses
the recent Fourth Circuit decision holding that State Department
determinations of head-of-state immunity are entitled to absolute
judicial deference while determinations of foreign official immunity
are not controlling.
Part IV presents detailed case studies of the post-Samantar
State Department submissions in six head-of-state immunity cases
and five foreign official immunity cases, analyzing the reasoning
behind the Department's pronouncements on immunity and the level
of deference claimed by the Department and awarded by the courts.
Part V proposes a two-tiered framework distilled from the factors
considered in these submissions for courts to apply in making
independent head-of-state or foreign official immunity decisions
should the State Department remain silent. Part V also proposes that
a rebuttable presumption of immunity should arise when the State
Department submits a Suggestion of Immunity in foreign official
immunity cases. Part VI briefly concludes. Ultimately, this Note
contends that a consistent framework has developed post-Samantar in
the State Department's considerations of both head-of-state and
official immunity and that courts should award that framework due
deference.
II. LAYING THE BOARD: A QUICK PRIMER OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
A. Status-Based Versus Conduct-Based Immunity
It is a basic principle of customary international law that
foreign states enjoy immunity from jurisdiction in the courts of other
sovereign states.5 This immunity is not restricted to the state itself
but also extends to such entities as its head of state, its diplomatic
envoys, and its armed forces stationed abroad.6 The Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement")
extends the immunity of a foreign state further to "any other public
4. Yousuf v. Samantar (Yousuf 1), No. 1:04-cv-1360, 2007 WL 2220579 (E.D. Va. Aug 1,
2007), rev'd, (Yousuf 11), 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd, (Yousuf III), 560 U.S. 305 (2010);
(Yousuf TV), No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2012 WL 3730617 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012), affd, (Yousuf
VI), 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
5. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 342 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
6. Id. at 460-61.
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minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed
in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
enforce a rule of law against the state."7 Former officials for the most
part enjoy residual immunity for any acts conducted in their official
capacity while in office. 8 However, as the Restatement makes clear, the
immunity afforded to foreign officials is bound up in the inherent
immunity of the foreign state. The immunity belongs to the foreign
state rather than to the official, and officials enjoy immunity only for
acts taken in their official capacity.9 A foreign state may choose to
waive immunity for current or former officials, even for acts conducted
in their official capacity. 10 Former officials for the most part enjoy
residual immunity for any acts conducted in their official capacity
while in office.
Foreign official immunity has historically been divided into two
types: status-based immunities and conduct-based immunities."
Status-based immunities apply to individuals because of their current
status and are designed to protect the individual's ability to conduct
affairs on behalf of the state.' 2 Individuals entitled to status-based
immunities include sitting heads of state,' 3 diplomats and consular
officials,14 and members of special missions.15 Conduct-based
immunities, on the other hand, derive from the official nature of an
individual's conduct and are designed to guard against judicial
oversight of government conduct.'6 Conduct-based immunity applies to
official acts of current and former foreign government officials, as well
as to those official acts conducted by former heads of state, diplomats,
and members of special missions while in office.' 7 Whether or not an
act is considered "official" depends on the nature of the act, and even
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 66 (1965).
8. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 1043-44 ("For his official acts as
Head of State he will, like any other agent of a state, enjoy continuing immunity.").
9. Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 22 61 (Feb.
14).
10. Statement of Interest of U.S. at 7, Yousuf V, No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2012 WL
3730617 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012) (No. 147) [hereinafter Yousuf SOI]. See also In re Doe, 860 F.2d
40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Because it is the state that gives the power to lead and the ensuing
trappings of power - including immunity - the state may therefore take back that which it
bestowed upon its erstwhile leaders.").
11. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States
Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1154 (2011).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1155.
14. Id. at 1156.
15. Id. at 1157.
16. Id. at 1154.
17. Id.
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"official acts" which violate international or domestic law are not
generally protected under conduct-based immunity.18
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States
The doctrinal roots of foreign sovereign immunity (and by
extension foreign official immunity) can be traced to the 1812 decision
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.19 In The Schooner Exchange,
the title to a ship sailing under French colors was disputed while the
vessel was anchored in U.S. waters for repair. 20 The U.S. Attorney
submitted a suggestion of immunity to the Court, but the Court
conducted its own independent evaluation. 21 The Court ultimately
extended immunity to the vessel as an entity of a foreign sovereign
nation,22 drawing on precedents regarding the immunity of the person
of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory, 23
the immunity afforded by all states to foreign ministers, 24 and the
consideration that a sovereign cedes a portion of its territorial
jurisdiction when it allows foreign troops to pass through its
territory.25
A period of absolute immunity followed the holding of The
Schooner Exchange, "under which a sovereign [could not], without [its]
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign." 26
The Court again dealt with foreign sovereign immunity in 1943 in
Ex parte Republic of Peru, another case involving the possible seizure
of a foreign vessel.2 7 There, the Court ruled that courts must
unequivocally accept the State Department's certification of
immunity.28 Reinforcing the holding of The Schooner Exchange, the
18. Id.
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
20. Id. at 122, 135.
21. Id. at 120-26.
22. Id. at 145-46 ("It seems then to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national
ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered
as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction."). Moreover, the Court concluded
that the avenging of wrongs committed by a foreign sovereign were "for diplomatic, rather than
legal discussion" and determination. Id. at 146.
23. Id. at 137.
24. Id. at 138.
25. Id. at 139.
26. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193,
199 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. 318 U.S. 578, 579-80 (1943).
28. Id. at 589 ('The certification and the request that the vessel be declared immune must
be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government
that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign
2014] 573
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Court noted that in cases involving the United States' relations with
foreign powers, "our national interest will be better served . . . through
diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial
proceedings." 29 Two years later, in 1945, the Court reasserted the
mandatory nature of the State Department's suggestions of immunity
in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman.3 0 The Court asserted: "It is therefore
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
government has not seen fit to recognize."31
During this period, courts applied a two-track process in cases
of foreign sovereign immunity, always looking to State Department
policy for a determination. 3 2 If the State Department offered a
suggestion in favor of immunity-track one-the court would accept
the immunity and dismiss the case. 33 If the Department remained
silent on the issue of immunity-track two-the court would "decide
for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity existed,"34
taking into account "whether the ground of immunity is one which it is
the established policy of the department to recognize."35 This process
was applied to suits concerning foreign states and their property as
well as to cases involving individual foreign officials asserting
immunity.36
The Court continued to apply this deferential framework until
1952 when the "Tate Letter" ushered in a significant shift in State
Department immunity practice.37 The Tate Letter announced the
United States' move to the "restricted theory" of sovereign immunity,
whereby a foreign state enjoys immunity for its public acts but not for
any commercial acts.38 The Department's restrictive application of
relations."). The Court went on to say that "[u]pon the submission of this certification to the
district court, it became the court's duty, in conformity to established principles, to release the
vessel and to proceed no further in the cause." Id.
29. Id.
30. 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
31. Id.
32. Koh, supra note 11, at 1143.
33. Id.
34. Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
35. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36; Koh, supra note 11, at 1143.
36. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2010).
37. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952). The letter was
prompted by the increasing engagement of foreign governments in commercial activities. Id. at
985.
38. Koh, supra note 11, at 1143.
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immunity continued until 1976 when Congress enacted the FSIA. 39
The purpose of the Act was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity and transfer the responsibility of making immunity
decisions for foreign states to the courts instead of the State
Department.40 Even after the FSIA's enactment, however, the
Executive Branch asserted that State Department determinations of
immunity were still required where claims of foreign official immunity
were raised because the Act only governed immunity determinations
for foreign states, not officials. 41 The Department continued to file
suggestions of immunity in foreign official immunity cases, 42 asserting
that they were entitled to absolute judicial deference. 43 Courts divided
39. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(0, 1441(d),
1602-1611 (2012).
40. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. at 313; Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004)
("[The FSIA] transfers primary responsibility for immunity determinations ... to the Judicial
Branch.").
41. Koh, supra note 11, at 1145. The State Department's position accorded with the
customary international law principle that a clear distinction is often drawn "between the
foreign state as a legal entity and the head of such a state as an individual." SATOW'S GUIDE TO
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 9 (Lord Gore-Booth ed., 5th ed. 1979).
42. Suggestions of Immunity and Statements of Interest are typically filed after an express
request is received by the State Department from the foreign government whose head of state or
official is the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Letter from Gabriel Silva, Colom. Ambassador to the
U.S., to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State at 2, Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 13-2):
The [Colombian] Embassy understands that this designation of immunity should
come from the Department of State in the form of a Suggestion of Immunity letter.
Thus, this Embassy kindly request [sic] the assistance of the Department of State in
preparing a Suggestion of Immunity letter to be submitted to the District Court by the
Attorney General.
The State Department, if it chooses to become involved, then submits a letter from the Legal
Advisor to the Department of Justice with a determination of whether or not immunity should be
extended to the official and the legal justifications for such a determination. The Department of
Justice then writes and files the Suggestion of Immunity or Statement of Interest with the
relevant court. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General."). For clarity, when referencing the views expressed in a
Suggestion or Statement, I will refer to the submitting party as the "Executive" or "Executive
Branch." It is important to note the potential for conflict this process may one day present should
the State Department and Justice Department take opposing views on an official's entitlement to
immunity. Technically it is the Department of Justice that makes the final determination in how
the Suggestion or Statement will be framed for the court. Because such a conflict between
Departments has not yet arisen in a head of state or conduct-based claim of immunity I only note
the potential as a factor to remain aware of when reading the Legal Advisor Letters and
Suggestions or Statements in tandem.
43. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 3, 8-9, Matar v.
Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2579-cv), 2007 WL 6931924. The Brief noted:
[I]n situations where the State Department has given a formal
recommendation.. . the courts need not reach questions of this type. The State
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on the issue of whether or not the FSIA applied to foreign official
immunity until the Supreme Court finally took up the issue in
Samantar v. Yousuf, more than thirty years after passage of the Act.
III. GAME CHANGER: SAMANTAR REINSTATES FOREIGN OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW
The circumstances surrounding the Samantar litigation were
anything but dull. In 2005, members of the Isaaq clan of Somalia filed
a civil action against Mohamed Ali Samantar under the Torture
Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") and the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").44
From 1980 until 1991, Samantar served as First Vice President 45 and
Minister of Defense and then Prime Minister of Somalia under the
military regime of General Mohamed Barre.46 The clan members
alleged that Samantar knew, or should have known, about the torture,
killings, and arbitrary detentions perpetrated by the Somali military
forces he commanded and that "he aided and abetted the commission
of these abuses."47 After the fall of the Barre regime in January 1991,
Samantar fled Somalia for the United States and took up residence in
Virginia.48
This Part details the Samantar litigation as it progressed from
the district court to the Supreme Court and back again. Primarily at
issue was whether Samantar was entitled to foreign official immunity
for the alleged acts against the Isaaq clan members. In 2010, the
Supreme Court held that the FSIA did not apply when determining
the immunity of foreign officials. 49 In 2012, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that Samantar was also not entitled to conduct-based foreign official
immunity under the common law.5 0 In addition to determining the
fate of Samantar, the litigation also addressed the reemerging position
of the State Department in determinations of foreign official
immunity.
Department is to make this determination, in light of the potential consequences to
our own international position. Hence, once the State Department has ruled in a
matter of this nature, the judiciary will not interfere.
Id. at 20 (quoting Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir.
1971)).
44. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. at 308.
45. Id.
46. Yousuf II, 552 F.3d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 2009).
47. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. at 308.
48. Yousuf II, 552 F.3d at 374.
49. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. at 308.
50. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d 763, 777-78 (4th Cir. 2012).
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A. Turn 1: The Lower Courts Collide
Before the district court in 2004, Samantar asserted that he
was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court submitted the question
to the State Department for a Statement of Interest, but after two
years of waiting without a response, the court set about determining
the status of Samantar's immunity itself.5 1 The district court held that
Samantar, as the former Minister of Defense and former Prime
Minister during the alleged events, undertook the acts on behalf of the
then-Somali government and was therefore entitled to immunity
under the FSIA.52 The court placed great weight on two letters
submitted by the Somali Transitional Federal Government ("TFG")
requesting immunity for Samantar and asserting that the alleged
actions were taken in his official capacities. 53
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, finding instead
that the FSIA did not apply to individuals, only foreign states, and
that Samantar was therefore not entitled to immunity under the Act.5 4
The Fourth Circuit looked to the text of the FSIA and its definition of
the term "foreign state," finding "no explicit mention of individuals or
natural persons."55 The court also examined the overall structure and
purpose of the FSIA and found no congressional intention to include
individuals within the ambit of the statute's immunity protections.56
The court concluded that Samantar was not entitled to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA but left open the possibility that Samantar
could invoke immunity under pre-FSIA common-law immunity
doctrines.57
B. Turn II: The Supreme Court Enters the Game
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether the FSIA provided immunity from suit for an individual
based on actions taken in his official capacity.58 In its amicus brief
supporting the Fourth Circuit's decision below, the State Department
opined that "principles articulated by the Executive Branch, not the
51. Yousuf I, No. 1:04-cv-1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007).
52. Id. at *11, *14.
53. Id. at *11. The court asserted that the United States both supported and recognized the
Somali Transitional Federal Government as the governing body in Somalia. Id.
54. Yousuf II, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009).
55. Id. at 377-78.
56. Id. at 380-81.
57. Id. at 383-84.
58. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010).
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FSIA, properly govern the immunity of foreign officials from civil suit
for acts in their official capacity."59
Citing historical sovereign immunity practices, the Department
recalled the pre-FSIA two-step procedure developed for determining
claims of sovereign immunity.60 Under step one, when a claim of
foreign immunity was raised, "the Executive Branch traditionally
provided the judiciary with suggestions of immunity, based on the
Executive Branch's judgments regarding customary international law
and reciprocal practice." 61 Under step two, "When the Executive
Branch made no specific recommendation, the courts decided the
immunity question 'in conformity to the principles' the Executive
Branch had previously articulated."62 As for foreign official immunity,
the State Department asserted that immunity was not limited to
current officials of the foreign government, but also attached
residually to the acts of former officials taken in their official capacity.
This conclusion was based on the customary international law
principle that "the immunity of foreign officials arises from the official
character of their acts."63
Turning to the FSIA, the State Department noted that the
statute made no reference to immunity for individual foreign officials
and therefore "left in place the pre-existing practice of recognizing
official immunity in accordance with suggestions of immunity by the
Executive Branch."64 The State Department asserted that immunity
for actions taken on behalf of a foreign state naturally "attaches when
(and because) the individual was acting as an officer of the foreign
state."6 5 However, the State Department qualified that "it does not
follow that Congress must have treated suits against individual
foreign officials identically to suits against foreign states."66
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the FSIA did not
govern the immunity of foreign officials.67 While the Act "indisputably
59. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 6, Yousuf III, 560 U.S.
305 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 342031.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 11. The State Department further asserted that this practice "promotes the
United States' interests in comity with other nations." Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 13-14.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. The government specifically referenced the FSIA House Report, which noted that
"with regard to discovery, 'official immunity,' of a kind existing separate from and outside of the
FSIA, would apply if a litigant sought to depose a 'high-ranking official of a foreign
government.' " Id. at 19 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, at 23 (1976)).
67. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010).
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governs the determination of whether a foreign state is entitled to
sovereign immunity,"68 the Court determined that nothing in the FSIA
suggested that the reading of "foreign state" should "include an official
acting on behalf of the foreign state."69 This reading of the statute,
according to the Court, also furthers the FSIA's dual purposes of
codifying the common law of state foreign immunity and addressing
the participation of foreign state enterprises in commercial activities.70
The Court found it had "been given no reason to believe that Congress
saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role
in determinations regarding individual official immunity."71
Finally, the Court determined that although the immunity of
an individual foreign official is not governed by the Act, a suit against
the official may still be barred. 72 Specifically, the Supreme Court left
open the option that Samantar could be entitled to immunity under
common-law principles, a determination it relegated to the lower
courts.73 The Court did not, however, define those principles or explain
how they should be applied in cases of foreign official immunity.
C. Turn III: The State Department Speaks
On remand to the district court, the State Department
submitted a Statement of Interest conveying the Department's
determination that Samantar was not immune from suit. 74 The State
Department grounded its finding on two critical circumstances: (1)
Samantar was a former official of a state with no recognized
government that could request immunity on his behalf and verify that
the acts in question were taken in an official capacity, and (2)
Samantar was a U.S. resident.75
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 319.
70. Id. at 322-23. The Court noted that "[iut hardly furthers Congress' purpose of 'clarifying
the rules that judges should apply in resolving sovereign immunity claims' to lump individual
officials in with foreign states without so much as a word spelling out how and when individual
officials are covered." Id. at 322 (quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699
(2004)). Foreign official immunity "simply was not the particular problem to which Congress was
responding when it enacted the FSIA." Id. at 323.
71. Id. at 323.
72. Id. at 325. For example, if the plaintiff names only a foreign official but the foreign
state itself is a required party or if the foreign state is the real party in interest, then the suit
will be barred regardless of the individual official's entitlement to immunity. Id. at 325-26.
73. Id.
74. Yousuf SOI, supra note 10, at 1.
75. Id. at 7.
2014] 579
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First, the State Department explained that the associated
foreign state typically requests a suggestion of immunity on behalf of
its officials when a claim of foreign official immunity is raised. 76 In
considering the request, the State Department takes into account the
foreign state's understanding of the official's acts and whether or not
they were performed in an official capacity.77 At the time of the
Suggestion of Immunity for Samantar, the United States did not
recognize a government "authorized either to assert or waive
[Samantar's] immunity or to opine on whether [Samantar's] alleged
actions were taken in an official capacity."78 Accordingly, the State
Department determined that immunity should not be recognized79
based on the principle that the "immunity protecting foreign officials
for their official acts ultimately belongs to the sovereign rather than
the official."80
The State Department then turned to the fact that Samantar
had been a resident of the United States since June 1997.81 While "[a]
foreign official's immunity is for the protection of the foreign state,"
the Department noted that "a former foreign official's decision to
permanently reside in the United States is not, in itself, determinative
of the former official's immunity from suit for acts taken while in
office." 82 However, because the United States "has a right to exercise
jurisdiction over its residents," the State Department determined that
a denial of immunity was warranted to allow "U.S. courts to
adjudicate claims by and against U.S. residents."83
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 9. Two competing putative government entities both sent letters to the State
Department regarding Samantar's immunity. The TFG sought to assert residual immunity on
behalf of Samantar while the government of the "Republic of Somaliland" sought to waive any
possible residual immunity. Id at 8. Because the Executive Branch did not recognize either
entity as the government of Somalia, the State Department determined that neither of the
entities was capable of waiving or asserting a claim of immunity on behalf of Samantar or
confirming or denying whether his alleged acts were taken in an official capacity. Id.
79. Id. at 9. The State Department did, however, reserve the right to reach a different
determination on the immunity of former foreign officials in future cases where no recognized
government exists, if the circumstances were different. Id.
80. Id. at 7. "Samantar is a former official of a state with no current government formally
recognized by the United States, who generally would enjoy only residual immunity, unless
waived, and even then only for actions taken in an official capacity." Letter from Harold Hongju
Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Tony West, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb.
11, 2001), Yousuf V, No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2012 WL 3730617 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012) (No.
147, Exhibit 1).
81. Yousuf SOI, supra note 10, at 9.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Finally, the State Department asserted that the Court should
defer to the Executive Branch's express determination of no immunity
for Samantar.84 The Department grounded its position in the
separation of powers doctrine. The Executive Branch plays "the
primary role in determining the immunity of foreign officials as an
aspect of the President's responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations and recognition of foreign governments." 8 Therefore,
because "it is . . . not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize,"86 the
State Department asserted that courts must defer to Executive
determinations of foreign official immunity.87 The district court
accepted the government's determination and dismissed Samantar's
common-law sovereign immunity defense.88
Samantar appealed, contending that the court improperly
deferred to the State Department's immunity determination without
conducting its own independent assessment.89 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of head-of-state and conduct-based
official immunity for Samantar.90 The court specifically addressed the
level of judicial deference that should be afforded to a suggestion of
immunity from the State Department, holding that head-of-state
immunity determinations are entitled to absolute deference, while
conduct-based immunity determinations for foreign officials are not
controlling but "carr[y] substantial weight in [the court's] analysis."91
The Fourth Circuit found that absolute deference to the State
Department's head-of-state immunity determinations lies in the
84. Id. at 6; see also Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201
(2d Cir. 1971) ("[Oince the State Department has ruled in a matter of this nature, the judiciary
will not interfere.").
85. Yousuf SOI, supra note 10, at 5-6. The Department elaborated that, given the
Executive's role as "the guiding organ in the conduct of [the United States'] foreign affairs" under
the Constitution, "it was 'an accepted rule of substantive law ... that [courts] accept and follow
the executive determination' on questions of foreign sovereign immunity." Id. at 3 (quoting
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)); see also Spacil v. Crowne, 489 F.2d 614,
618 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. Yousuf SOI, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
35 (1945)).
87. Id. at 6.
88. Yousuf IV, No. 1:04-cv-1360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011).
Samantar ultimately accepted a default judgment as to liability and the district court awarded
the plaintiffs a total of $21 million in damages. Yousuf V, No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2012 WL
3730617, at *16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012), aff'd, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012).
89. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2012).
90. Id. at 768-69, 778.
91. Id. at 773.
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constitutional assignment of "the power to receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers" to the Executive Branch, including "the power
to accredit diplomats and recognize foreign heads of state."92
Therefore, because head-of-state immunity involves the
"quintessentially executive function" of "a formal act of recognition,"
the court determined that head-of-state immunity suggestions from
the State Department should be controlling on the judiciary. 93
Nevertheless, there is no equivalent constitutional basis for a finding
of conduct-based immunity for foreign officials, the court concluded,
since foreign official immunity rests on the scope of officials' duties
alone, not their status.94 Because foreign official immunity "turn[s]
upon principles of customary international law and foreign policy,"
courts should still respect the views of the Executive Branch, though
not defer automatically to it.95
The Fourth Circuit then independently evaluated Samantar's
claims of immunity. The court dismissed Samantar's head-of-state
immunity claim because the State Department never recognized him
as the head of state of Somalia. 96 Moreover, the court ultimately
agreed with the State Department's determination that Samantar was
not entitled to conduct-based foreign official immunity, since he was a
former official of a State with no currently recognized government and
was a resident of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts.9 7 However, the Fourth Circuit added an additional reason for
denying Samantar's immunity: he had violated jus cogens norms.98
The court concluded that, "under international and domestic law,
officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official
92. Id. at 772 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3).
93. Id. (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity & Federal Common Law,
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 606 (2011)).
94. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d at 773.
95. Id. at 773.
96. Id. at 772 (noting also that "the State Department does not recognize the Transitional
Federal Government or any other entity as the official government of Somalia, from which
immunity would derive in the first place").
97. Id. at 777-78.
98. Id. at 776-77. A jus cogens norm "is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
322. The Fourth Circuit looked to international precedent, namely Regina v. Bartle, ex parte
Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 593-95 (H.L. 1999), as well as American cases in formulating its
assertion that jus cogens violations operate to remove foreign official immunity even for acts
undertaken in an official capacity. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d at 776-77.
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immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in
the defendant's official capacity."99
After the Fourth Circuit's most recent decision, Samantar
petitioned the Supreme Court again for a writ of certiorari on the
question of whether a foreign official's conduct-based immunity is
abrogated by claims that his official acts violated jus cogens norms. 100
However, the Supreme Court declined to weigh in on this question,
denying certiorari in January 2013.101 It remains to be seen if other
courts will side with the Fourth Circuit on this controversial issue.
IV. NEW MOVES: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POST-SAMANTAR
SUGGESTIONS OF IMMUNITY
Taken together, the State Department has penned eleven
Suggestions of Immunity and Statements of Interest since the
Supreme Court ruled in Samantar. Of these determinations, six dealt
with immunity claims for a sitting head of state, 102 and five dealt with
conduct-based immunity claims for former officials.103 These
Suggestions and Statements provide key insights into the State
99. Id. at 777. The court further noted that while violations of jus cogens norms remove
foreign official immunity, head-of-state immunity is absolute and will operate even in the face of
such claims. Id. at 776. While the implication of jus cogens norm violations on official immunity
is a developing and controversial topic in international law, this Note will not address jus cogens
violations in depth. For detailed analyses of jus cogens violations and state and official immunity,
see generally Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 731 (2012);
Sdvrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS.
149 (2011); Beth Stephens, Abusing the Authority of the State: Denying Foreign Official
Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1163 (2011); Paul B.
Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1073 (2011); John B.
Bellinger, III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future
Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 819 (2011).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Samantar v. Yousuf, 2013 WL 836952 (U.S. Mar. 4,
2013) (No. 12-1078).
101. Denial of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Samantar v. Yousuf, 2014 WL 102984 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 12-1078).
102. Devi v. Rajapaksa, No. 11 Civ. 6634, 2012 WL 3866495 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); Tawfik
v. al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455, 2012 WL 3542209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012); Manoharan v.
Rajapaksa, 845 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Al-Nashiri (Military Comm'ns
Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, Feb. 17, 2012) (No. AE 037C), available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx; Habyarimana v. Kagame, 821 F. Supp. 2d
1244 (W.D. Okla. 2011); Hassen v. al Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106 DMG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144819 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010).
103. Doe v. Zedillo Ponce de Leon, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2012); Giraldo
v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D.D.C. 2011); Abi Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v. Cigna
Worldwide Ins. Co., 391 Fed. App'x. 173 (3d Cir. 2010); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 15, 2011); Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381-DLI-CLP (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
17, 2012).
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Department's developing internal foreign official immunity doctrine.
Parsing these submissions reveals a rubric that is taking shape, which
can help guide both the State Department and the courts when faced
with questions of foreign official immunity. This Part traces the State
Department's Suggestions of Immunity and Statements of Interest
chronologically, separated into the two categories of head-of-state
immunity and conduct-based immunity.10 4
A. Head-of-State Immunity
1. Sheikh Khalifa, President, United Arab Emirates
In the first head-of-state Suggestion of Immunity submitted
after the Supreme Court's decision in Samantar, the State
Department suggested immunity for Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al
Nahyan ("Sheikh Khalifa"), the President and sitting head of state of
the United Arab Emirates ("UAE").105 The plaintiff filed suit against
Sheikh Khalifa, as well as Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan
("Sheikh Mohamed") and General Saeed Hilal Abdullah Al Darmaki
("General Hilal"), under the TVPA for allegedly abducting,
imprisoning, and torturing him over a period of two years.106 All three
defendants were citizens and residents of the UAE, 07 and all three
sought immunity from the State Department. 08 The UAE formally
requested a suggestion of immunity on behalf of Sheikh Khalifa.109
The State Department submitted an opinion asserting immunity for
Sheikh Khalifa but remained silent regarding Sheikh Mohamed and
General Hilal.110
The Suggestion of Immunity for Sheikh Khalifa noted that the
case had important foreign policy implications for the United
104. The chronological approach is altered slightly to discuss two cases filed against the
same head of state together.
105. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the U.S. at 1, Hassen v. Sheikh Khalifa Bin
Zayed Al Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106 DMG (MANx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144819 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2010) (No. 51) [hereinafter Sheikh Khalifa SOI].
106. Hassen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144819, at *1-2. At the time of the alleged torture,
Sheikh Khalifa was head of both the army and the state security agency of the UAE, Sheikh
Mohamed was a major with the UAE Air Force, and General Hilal was the Minister for Interior
Affairs for the UAE and commander of the detention facility in which the plaintiff was held. Id.
at *4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *15-16. Both Sheikh Khalifa and Sheikh Mohamed asserted head-of-state
immunity. Id.
109. Sheikh Khalifa SOI, supra note 105, at 1-2.
110. Hassen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144819, at *16.
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States.11' Allowing the suit to continue against Sheikh Khalifa "would
be incompatible with the United States' foreign policy interests."112 In
his letter conveying the determination to the Department of Justice,
the State Department's Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh stated that
Sheikh Khalifa was entitled to immunity under the rule of customary
international law that the sitting head of a foreign state "is immune
from the jurisdiction of the United States courts."113
The Suggestion also asserted that the State Department's
determination was controlling, citing extensive precedent that courts
have routinely accepted Executive Branch determinations of head-of-
state immunity as dispositive.114 The Koh letter also cited the
Executive Branch's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs,
its institutional resources and expertise, and the sensitivity and
complexity of international relations as further support for judicial
deference to the State Department's determinations of head-of-state
immunity.116 The Suggestion also referenced a prior suggestion of
immunity for the preceding President of the UAE, noting that the
district court in that case had accepted it as determinative.116
The district court accepted the suggestion of immunity on
behalf of Sheikh Khalifa, stating that "[w]hen the State Department
grants a foreign sovereign's request for a suggestion of immunity, the
district court surrenders its jurisdiction."'1 7 The court conducted its
own analysis, however, of Sheikh Mohamed's entitlement to
immunity. Relying on Restatement § 66, the court identified the UAE's
head of state, head of government, and its foreign minister; because
Sheikh Mohamed was not one of those three individuals or a
designated member of their retinues, the court determined he was not
entitled to absolute immunity as a head of state."18
The court then turned to the common law to determine if
Sheikh Mohamed was entitled to any form of foreign official immunity
for the acts taken in his official capacity." 9 Without any explanation,
111. Sheikh Khalifa SOI, supra note 105, at 1.
112. Id.
113. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Tony West, Sheikh Khalifa SOI, supra note 105, at 7
(Exhibit 1).
114. Sheikh Khalifa SOI, supra note 105, at 1-3 ("[Tlhis determination should be given
binding effect by this Court.")
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 3-4.
117. Hassen v. Sheikh Khalifa, No. CV 09-01106 DMG (MANx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144819, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010).
118. Id. at *14-15.
119. Id. at *15 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.
§ 66(f) (1965)).
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the court ruled that Sheikh Mohamed was not entitled to immunity,
finding "no legal basis to extend absolute immunity to either the head
of a state's armed forces or to the head of a state's political
subdivision."120 Yet, as Crown Prince, head of the army, and, at the
time of the alleged acts, head of state security, presumably Sheikh
Mohamed was an "official" for the purposes of conduct-based
immunity. It seems as though the court, instead of conducting its own
investigation of Sheikh Mohamed's potential common-law immunity,
simply accepted the State Department's silence as a de facto
determination that he was not entitled to immunity. In the end, the
district court dismissed Sheikh Khalifa while allowing the case to
proceed against both Sheikh Mohamed and General Hilal.121
2. Paul Kagame, President, Rwanda
A little over a year later, the State Department filed another
Suggestion of Immunity, arguing in favor of head-of-state immunity
for Paul Kagame, the President of the Republic of Rwanda. 122 The
widows of the deceased Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi brought
suit against Kagame and others, alleging that they planned and
executed the assassination of their former spouses. 123 The Government
of Rwanda formally requested that the State Department intervene in
the proceedings and suggest immunity for President Kagame. 124
Citing its sole authority to determine sitting head-of-state
immunity, the State Department recognized President Kagame's
immunity from the suit "while in office," a specification not utilized in
the previous Suggestion of Immunity for Sheikh Khalifa. 125 In
determining President Kagame's immunity, the State Deparment
considered customary international law, U.S. foreign policy, and
international relations. 126 The language of this Suggestion was
stronger than that of Sheikh Khalifa, with the State Department,
asserting twice that "[n]o court has ever subjected a sitting head of
state to suit once the Executive Branch has suggested the head of
state's immunity."127 Again, the Government referenced the historical
120. Id. at *16-17.
121. Id. at *69.
122. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the U.S. at 1, Habyarimana v. Kagame, 821 F.
Supp. 2d 1244 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (No. 49) [hereinafter Kagame SOI1.
123. Kagame, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1247-48.
124. Id. at 1260.
125. Kagame SOI, supra note 122, at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2, 5.
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precedent for absolute judicial deference to the Executive Branch's
suggestions of head-of-state immunity, "motivated by the caution we
believe appropriate of the Judicial Branch when the conduct of foreign
affairs is involved."128
The Suggestion for President Kagame more fully clarified the
customary international law principles behind the head-of-state
immunity doctrine. Introducing a new limitation, the Suggestion
noted that "head of state immunity attaches to a head of state's status
as the current holder of the office." 129 While the individual is the
sitting head of state, even acts committed before he assumed the
position are protected because head-of-state immunity protects the
office itself. 130 However, once the head of state leaves office, "that
individual generally retains residual immunity only for acts taken in
an official capacity while in that position and not for alleged acts
predating the individual's tenure in office." 131
After receiving the Suggestion of Immunity for President
Kagame, the district court permitted the plaintiffs to respond and
object to the Suggestion. 132 The court ultimately accepted the State
Department's conclusion that President Kagame was immune from
suit as the sitting head of state of Rwanda and dismissed the suit,
noting that it was bound to do so. 133 The court cited both the Executive
Branch's primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs and the separation
of powers doctrine as justifications for judicial deference to its head-of-
state immunity decisions. 134
3. Mahinda Rajapaksa, President, Sri Lanka
In 2012, two Suggestions of Immunity were filed in two
separate cases on behalf of Mahinda Rajapaksa, the President and
sitting head of state of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka. 135 Sri Lanka had formally requested a suggestion of immunity
128. Id. at 5 (quoting Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, § 456, at 1043-44.
132. Habyarimana v. Kagame, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1260 (W.D. Okla. 2011).
133. Id. at 1263-64 ("Where the United States' Executive Branch has concluded that a
foreign head of state is immune from suit, and where it has urged the Court to take recognition
of that fact and to dismiss the suit pending against said head of state, the Court is bound to do
so.").
134. Id. at 1261.
135. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the U.S. at 1, Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 12) [hereinafter Rajapaksa SOI I]; Suggestion of Immunity
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for President Rajapaksa in both cases.13 6 Both Suggestions afforded
head-of-state immunity to President Rajapaksa, utilizing nearly
identical language and arguments, with the latter noting that the
district court in the first case had dismissed the claims against
President Rajapaksa because the State Department's Suggestion was
"conclusive and not subject to judicial review."13 7 The most significant
difference between the two Suggestions is a subtle shift in
terminology. The first Suggestion is framed in precatory language and
"suggests" to the court that President Rajapaksa is immune, 138 while
the second Suggestion "informs" the court of his immunity and
strongly asserts the Executive Branch's control over head-of-state
immunity decisions.139 However, in both cases, the language of the
letters from the State Department Legal Adviser to the Department of
Justice was identical.140
The district court accepted both of the State Department's
determinations of immunity for President Rajapaksa as binding. The
court in Manoharan v. Rajapaksa found that it was "not in a position
to second-guess the Executive's determination that in this case, the
nation's foreign policy interests will be best served by granting
Submitted by the U.S. at 1, Devi v. Rajapaksa, No. 11 Civ. 6634 (NRB), 2012 WL 3866495
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (No. 6) [hereinafter Rajapaksa SOI II].
136. Rajapaksa SOI I, supra note 135, at 2; Rajapaksa SOI II, supra note 135, at 2.
137. Rajapaksa SOI Il, supra note 135 at 5-6.
138. E.g., Rajapaksa SOI I, supra note 135, at 1 ("The United States ... hereby suggests to
the Court the immunity of President Rajapaksa from this suit." (emphasis added)); id. at 2 ("No
court has ever subjected a sitting head of state to suit once the Executive Branch has suggested
the head of state's immunity." (emphasis added)); id. at 2 ("Sri Lanka has formally requested the
Government of the United States to suggest the immunity of President Rajapaksa from this
lawsuit." (emphasis added)); id. at 4 ("When the Executive Branch suggests the immunity of a
sitting head of state, judicial deference to that suggestion is predicated on compelling
considerations arising out of the Executive Branch's authority to conduct foreign affairs under
the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
139. E.g., Rajapaksa SOI II, supra note 135, at 1 ("The United States ... hereby informs the
Court that President Rajapaksa is immune from this suit." (emphasis added)); id. at 1-2 ('Thus,
no court has ever subjected a sitting head of state to suit once the Executive Branch has
determined that a head of state is immune." (emphasis added)); id. at 2 ("Sri Lanka has formally
requested the Government of the United States to determine that President Rajapaksa is
immune from this lawsuit." (emphasis added)); id. at 4 ('When the Executive Branch determines
that a sitting head of state is immune from suit, judicial deference to that determination is
predicated on compelling considerations arising out of the Executive Branch's authority to
conduct foreign affairs under the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
140. Compare Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Tony West at 1, Manoharan, 845 F. Supp.
2d 260 (No. 12-1), with Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Stuart F. Delery at 1, Devi, No. 11 Civ.
6634 (NRB), 2012 WL 3866495 (No. 6-1). The only elements to change from the first letter to the
second were those necessary for proper identification of the case and the appropriate Assistant
Attorney Generals to whom the letters were addressed.
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Defendant Rajapaksa head-of-state immunity while he is in office." 141
In Devi v. Rajapaksa, the plaintiff and amicus curiae filed responses to
the Suggestion of Immunity, arguing that the case against President
Rajapaksa should be permitted to continue despite the State
Department's recommendation.14 2 The court, however, asserted that
"[t]he determination that a defendant is entitled to head of state
immunity is left to the discretion of the Executive Branch,"143 a
privilege resulting from the President's authority in international and
diplomatic relations.144 Finally, the court noted that its deference
"reflects a considered judgment concerning the appropriate role of the
courts within the constitutional order."145
4. Ali Abdullah Saleh, President, Yemen
The State Department's involvement in head-of-state immunity
decisions extends beyond cases in traditional federal courts. In
February 2012, the Department recognized the immunity of Ali
Abdullah Saleh, the President and sitting head of state of the Republic
of Yemen, in a case proceeding before the Military Commissions Trial
Judiciary in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.146 Since President Saleh was not
a party to the action, the Government Response specifically addressed
his immunity from the Commission's jurisdiction to compel his
testimony as sought by the defense.147 The Response stated that, as a
sitting head of state, President Saleh is immune "from jurisdiction of
any court of the United States, including this Commission, to compel
his oral deposition."14 8 Citing the same historical and judicial
authority outlined above, the Response asserts that the Executive
Branch maintains the sole authority for head-of-state immunity
141. Manoharan, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
142. Devi, 2012 WL 3866495, at *2.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id. at *4.
145. Id.
146. Government Response to Defense Motion to Depose Yemeni President Ali Abdullah
Saleh at 1, United States v. Al-Nashiri (Military Comm'ns Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay,
Feb. 17, 2010) (No. AE 037C), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx
(follow "Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri (2)" hyperlink; select "Docket" from
"Category" drop down box; follow "Government Response to Defense Motion to Depose Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh" hyperlink).
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id. at 1. It is unclear whether Yemen requested immunity on behalf of President Saleh
as neither the State Department letter nor the Government Response filed in the case
acknowledged a formal request.
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determinations and that its determinations are controlling and not
subject to judicial review.149
The State Department letter requesting the filing of a
Suggestion of Immunity on behalf of President Saleh utilized the same
framework and principles-and even some identical language-as
those submitted for the cases in federal court.o50 While both the
Government Response and the State Department letter framed
President Saleh's immunity as head-of-state immunity, Military Judge
Pohl framed it in terms of diplomatic immunity.161 The opinion cites
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the
complementary Diplomatic Relations Act which "accord accredited
diplomats absolute immunity from criminal suit and almost absolute
immunity from civil or administrative action unless the diplomat is
acting in certain, specified, circumstances outside their official
duties."152 The Commission noted that whether an individual is
entitled to diplomatic immunity is a matter for the Department of
State to decide, and when the Department issues such a certification,
"courts are bound to accept a determination by the Department of
State that a diplomatic agent, to include a head-of-state, is entitled to
diplomatic immunity."153
5. Sheikh Al-Sabah, Emir, Kuwait
The most recent head-of-state immunity determination was
filed on behalf of Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah ("Sheikh
Al-Sabah"), the Emir and sitting head of state of the State of
Kuwait.15 4 After a formal request by Kuwait for a determination that
149. Id. at 2-3.
150. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Brigadier Gen. Mark Martins at 1, Government
Response to Defense Motion to Depose Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh at 1, United States
v. Al-Nashiri (Military Comm'ns Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay Feb. 17, 2010) (No. AE 037C,
Attachment B). The letter does not request a note in the Department of Justice filing requesting
the Executive Branch's retention of authority to refrain from making a similar immunity
determination in future cases, a section included in all letters attached to Suggestions since the
Kagame Suggestion.
151. Opinion on Defense Motion to Depose Yemini President Ali Abdulla Sale [sic] at 1,
United States v. Al-Nashiri (Military Comm'ns Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay Feb. 17, 2010)
(No. AE 037F), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (follow "Abd
al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu Al-Nashiri (2)" hyperlink; select "Docket" from "Category"
drop down box; follow "Military Judge's Opinion - Motion to Depose Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh" hyperlink).
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id.
154. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the U.S. at 1, Tawfik v. Sheikh Al-Ahmad Al-
Jaber Al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455 (ALC)(JCF), 2012 WL 3542209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (No.
23) [hereinafter Al-Sabah SOI].
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Sheikh Al-Sabah is immune, the State Department recognized his
immunity.155 The Suggestion remained consistent with previous
Suggestions in both form and content and retained the more assertive
language of the post-Manoharan Suggestions. 15 6 The State
Department letter informing the Justice Department of its
determination that Sheikh Al-Sabah was entitled to head-of-state
immunity also mirrored the earlier Suggestions exactly. 15 7
In the Suggestion for Sheikh Al-Sabah, the Government again
asserted that its determination of immunity "is controlling and is not
subject to judicial review."158 The district court, however, while
ultimately deferring to the Suggestion and dismissing the case, found
that it "does not-and need not-adopt a broader holding that the
Executive Branch's determination is perforce 'controlling' and 'not
subject to judicial review.' "169 Nevertheless, the court essentially
contradicted itself, stating that "unless and until Congress (or a
higher court) states otherwise, the State Department's determination
that the Emir is immune from suit is controlling here." 60
B. Conduct-Based Foreign Official Immunity
1. Abdi Aden Magan, Former Official, Somalia
Samantar was in good company after the Supreme Court
determined that he was not entitled to immunity. The State
Department, in its first post-Samantar conduct-based immunity
determination, also refused to recommend immunity for Abdi Aden
Magan, another former official of the Barre regime in Somalia. 161
Magan, a U.S. resident living in Ohio since 2000, served as Colonel in
the National Security Service of Somalia and as Chief of its
Department of Investigations from about 1988-1990.162 The plaintiff,
a native of Somalia and citizen of the United Kingdom, sued Magan in
a U.S. district court under the TVPA and the ATS, alleging arbitrary
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Stuart F. Delery at 1, Al-Sabah SOI, supra note 154
(Exhibit A).
158. Al-Sabah SOI, at 1.
159. Tawfik, 2012 WL 3542209, at *2.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 1, Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-
cv-342 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2011) (No. 45) [hereinafter Magan Statement].
162. Letter from Harold Hongju Kohn to Tony West at 1, Statement of Interest of the United
States of America at 1, Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-342 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2011) (No. 45-1)
[hereinafter Koh Letter for Magan].
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detention, cruel and inhumane treatment, and torture. 163 The State
Department noted, as it did in its determination of no immunity for
Samantar, that Magan was a former official of a state with a
government that the United States did not formally recognize. 164
There was, therefore, no legitimate government to assert immunity on
Magan's behalf.165
The two circumstances that the State Department deemed
critical to determining that Magan was not entitled to foreign official
immunity were identical to those that it asserted against Samantar:
(1) Magan was a former official of a state with no recognized
government to request immunity on his behalf or to verify that the
acts in question were taken in an official capacity, and (2) U.S.
residents who enjoy the protections of U.S. law should be subject to
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.166 Because the immunity protecting the
conduct of foreign officials belongs to the sovereign, former officials
only "enjoy residual immunity for acts taken in an official capacity
while in office" (assuming the foreign state does not waive that
immunity).167 In making a determination of conduct-based foreign
official immunity, the Executive Branch considers whether a "foreign
state understood its official to have acted in an official capacity," and
absent a recognized government to assert such understanding, "the
Department of State has determined that such immunity should not
be recognized." 68 However, the Statement for Magan seemed to
suggest that the State Department considers itself the ultimate
determinant of whether or not the foreign official's acts were taken in
an official capacity (and thus whether or not immunity attaches).s69
Finally, because "a state generally has a right to exercise jurisdiction
over its residents," the State Department determined that the interest
of allowing U.S. courts to adjudicate claims against U.S. residents
163. Id.
164. Id. The State Department elaborated that while the United States continues to
recognize the State of Somalia, as well as support the efforts of the transitional government, the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), to establish a viable central government it does not
recognize the TFG or any other entity as the formal government of Somalia. Id. at 1-2.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Magan Statement at 7.
167. Id. (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
61 (Feb. 14) (Merits)).
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id.:
In future cases presenting different circumstances, the Department could determine
either that a former official of a state without a recognized government is immune
from civil suit for acts taken in an official capacity, or that a former official of a state
with a recognized government is not immune from civil suit for acts that were not
taken in an official capacity.
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called for a denial of immunity in Magan's case.170 However, the
Statement noted that the decision by a former foreign official to
permanently reside in the United States is not, by itself,
determinative of whether the official is entitled to immunity for those
acts taken in an official capacity while in office.171
The Statement of Interest for Magan also emphasized the
deference that U.S. courts have historically shown to the Executive
Branch's determinations of foreign immunity. 172 Utilizing an oft
quoted phrase, the Statement asserted that "[t]he Supreme Court
made clear that '[i]t is ... not for the courts to deny an immunity
which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity
on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize.' "173 The State Department again rooted this judicial
deference in the separation of powers and the Executive's
constitutional duty to manage the nation's foreign affairs. 174 The
Statement recalls the Supreme Court's finding in Samantar that there
was "no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted
to eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding
individual official immunity."175 Therefore, because the Executive
Branch submitted an express opinion on Magan's immunity, the court
"should accept and defer to th[at] determination."1 76 The district court,
after responses from both Magan and the plaintiff, deferred to the
State Department's determination and found that Magan was not
immune from suit.177
2. Alvaro Uribe, Former President, Colombia
Once heads of state leave office, they lose their total immunity
but retain classical conduct-based immunity for acts taken in their
official capacity while they were in office.178 The plaintiffs in Giraldo v.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945)).
174. Id. (quoting Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948)).
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Opinion and Order at 3, Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-342 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011) (No.
67). The suit proceeded, with Magistrate Judge Mark Abel eventually recommending an award
to plaintiff of $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Report
and Recommendation at 13, No. 2:10-cv-342 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (No. 112).
178. See supra Part III.A (explaining that while the Samantar court held that Congress did
not intend to include individuals under FSIA sovereign immunity, individuals could invoke
immunity under pre-FSIA common-law immunity doctrines).
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Drummond Co., Inc. sought to depose former President of Colombia
Alvaro Uribe regarding his relationship with the United Self Defense
Forces of Colombia ("AUC") and the Drummond Company.179
Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to depose Uribe regarding his role in
starting the AUC while governor of Antioquia and other actions
during his presidency. 180
The State Department determined that Uribe was entitled to
testimonial immunity, but only conditionally. 181 Uribe was immune
from giving the plaintiffs information about acts taken in his official
capacity as a government official, 182 but he was not immune from
being questioned about acts taken outside of his official capacity or
while he was not yet a government official. 183 The State Department
based its determination on considerations of foreign policy,
specifically, avoiding "unnecessary irritants" in the United States'
relations with Colombia 84 and ensuring reciprocal treatment of
former U.S. presidents traveling abroad.185
The Statement for Uribe drew on the same precedents cited in
the Magan case justifying a deferential judicial posture toward
Executive Branch determinations of foreign official immunity.186 The
Colombian government formally requested that the State Department
suggest "any and all immunities applicable to President Uribe and to
specifically request head-of-state immunity on his behalf."187 However,
the State Department limited President Uribe to the same conduct-
based immunity afforded all former foreign officials, as he was no
longer the sitting head of state of Columbia.
179. 808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248 (D.D.C. 2011).
180. Id.
181. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Tony West at 1, Giraldo, 808 F. Supp. 2d 247 (No.
13-2) [hereinafter Koh Letter on Uribe].
182. Id.
183. Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity of and by the U.S. at 1-2, Giraldo,
808 F. Supp. 2d 247 (No. 13) [hereinafter Uribe Suggestion]. In addition, "in light of President
Uribe's immunity and for reasons of comity," the State Department suggested that the court
initially stay his deposition and direct the plaintiffs to first exhaust other reasonable channels of
gathering the information available under Colombian law. Koh Letter on Uribe, supra note 181,
at 1.
184. Koh Letter on Uribe, supra note 181, at 1.
185. Id. at 1-2.
186. See Uribe Suggestion, supra note 183, at 2-4 (citing to Samantar v. Yousuf, Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, and Ludecke v. Watkins as evidence that a deferential judicial posture is
rooted in the Constitutional separation of powers). "[Clourts today must continue to defer to
Executive determinations of foreign official immunity, just as they deferred to determinations of
foreign state immunity before the enactment of the FSIA." Id. at 4.
187. Id. at 5 (quoting Letter from Gabriel Silva, Colom. Ambassador to the U.S., to Hillary
Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State (Nov. 12, 2010), Uribe Suggestion, Exhibit 1).
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The district court accepted the State Department's suggestion
of conduct-based immunity for Uribe and further clarified the scope of
such immunity. First, the court noted that "mere allegations of
illegality do not serve to render an action unofficial for purposes of
foreign official immunity."188 Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that illegal acts are not immune, finding that "such a rule
would eviscerate the protection of foreign official immunity and would
contravene federal law on foreign official immunity."189 The court also
deferred to the Government's suggestion that comity and foreign
relations require not deposing Uribe unless all other reasonably
available means of acquiring the needed information were
exhausted.190 Finally, the court found that even jus cogens violations
do not defeat conduct-based foreign official immunity because such a
rule would strain diplomatic relations and render hollow any
protection afforded by foreign official immunity.191
3. Josie Senesie & Foday Sesay, Insurance Commissioners, Liberia
The State Department offered a similarly limited conduct-
based immunity suggestion for the past and current Insurance
Commissioners of the Republic of Liberia, Josie Senesie and Foday
Sesay.192 The case centered on protracted litigation begun in 1991
concerning insurance coverage for property that was damaged in the
Liberian civil war. 193 The Republic of Liberia formally requested
immunity for both Senesie and Sesay, renewing the request four times
before the Statement of Interest was eventually filed.194
188. Giraldo, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
189. Id. at 250.
190. Id. at 252.
191. Id. at 250. A jus cogens exception would merge the merits of the underlying claim with
the issue of immunity such that "[a]s soon as a party alleged a violation of a jus cogens norm, a
court would have to determine whether such a norm was indeed violated in order to determine
immunity ..... Id. Moreover, the court notes that even the Supreme Court has suggested that
even jus cogens violations are still official actions if conducted in an official capacity. Id. at 251;
see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) ("[H]owever monstrous such abuse
undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police . . . [is] peculiarly
sovereign in nature.").
192. Statement of Interest of the U.S. at 1, Abi Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v. CIGNA
Worldwide Ins. Co., No. 2:91-cv-06785-PD (E.D. Penn. Dec. 5, 2011) (No. 290) [hereinafter
Senesie/Sesay Statement].
193. Id. at 2.
194. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Tony West at 2, Abi Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v.
CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., No. 2:91-cv-06785-PD (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011) (No. 290-1) [hereinafter
Koh Letter on Senesie/Sesay] ("The Republic of Liberia, by diplomatic note dated August 17,
2010, requested a Statement of Interest suggesting immunity for the Respondents. Liberia
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This determination was unique, however, in that the State
Department afforded immunity to Senesie and Sesay only "to the
extent the District Court finds that, under Liberian law, they acted in
their official capacities as Liberia's Commissioner of Insurance."95
The Department determined that as Commissioners of Insurance at
the time of the conduct, Senesie and Sesay were officials of the
Republic of Liberia and were "generally entitled to immunity while
acting in that capacity."196 The Department noted that whether or not
the acts in question could be deemed official in nature would turn on
their characterization under Liberian law, leaving such analysis for
the district court. 197 The Department recognized that "Liberian law
may treat acts taken in the Insurance Commissioner's capacity as
representative of the estate as acts taken in his official capacity, in
which event he would not be acting solely in his capacity as
representative of the estate."198
4. Ernesto Zedillo, Former President, Mexico
The immunity entitlement of a former head of state was again
raised in a lawsuit filed against Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, a
former President of Mexico, under the TVPA alleging that Zedillo was
legally responsible for a 1997 massacre of local villagers by
paramilitary groups in Acteal, Chiapas.199 The State Department
determined that President Zedillo was immune from the suit under
conduct-based foreign official immunity after Mexico formally
requested a suggestion of immunity. 200 The State Department
explained that it "generally presumes that actions taken by a foreign
official exercising the powers of his office were taken in his official
capacity."201 This presumption is strongest when a former head of
renewed its request by diplomatic notes dated October 12, 2010, November 15, 2010, and August
8, 2011, and by note verbale on March 2, 2011.").
195. Id. at 1. As an aside, the Department also extended extremely limited immunity to
Samuel Lohman, an American citizen Senesie retained as counsel the same day he was
appointed receiver of the CWW estate. Senesie/Sesay Statement, supra note 192, at 1-2. The
Department determined that any immunity claimed by Lohman derives from, and cannot extend
beyond, the immunity Senesie enjoys for those acts deemed to be taken in his official capacity.
Koh Letter on Senesie/Sesay, supra note 194, at 1.
196. Koh Letter on Senesie/Sesay, supra note 194, at 3.
197. Id. (acknowledging the fact that "the character of an act under the law of the foreign
state is not the only relevant factor in making immunity determinations").
198. Id.
199. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Stuart F. Delery at 1, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-
01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2012) (No. 38-1) [hereinafter Koh Letter on Zedillo].
200. Id.
201. Id.
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state is sued "because holders of a country's highest office may be
expected to be on duty at all times and to have wide-ranging
responsibilities," particularly when the foreign government asserts
that acts were taken in an official capacity, as Mexico did. 202 Unless
the plaintiff then rebuts this presumption, the State Department will
generally conclude that immunity is appropriate. 203
In this case, the State Department determined that the
plaintiffs' complaint was predicated on actions taken by Zedillo when
he was President and that the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficient
basis for the Department to question its initial presumption of
immunity for the former head of state.204 In the Suggestion of
Immunity, the Executive Branch asserted that its determination is
"controlling and is not subject to judicial review." 205 After the
Suggestion was submitted, the district court issued an order to show
cause, allowing the plaintiffs to submit their objections. 206 Both
parties filed multiple responses to the Order, but the district court
ultimately dismissed the case after oral argument. 207
5. Ahmed Shuja Pasha & Nadeem Taj, Former Officials, Pakistan
The State Department submitted its most recent conduct-based
immunity determination in connection with the 2008 Mumbai
terrorist attacks. In a Statement of Interest and Suggestion of
Immunity filed in December 2012, the State Department determined
that two former Directors General of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate ("ISI"), Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Nadeem Taj,
were immune from suit based on residual conduct-based immunity.208
202. Id. at 1-2.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. ("Plaintiffs allegations seeking to hold former President Zedillo liable simple
because he was serving as President when lower level officials allegedly committed tortious acts
do not provide the Department with a sufficient reason to question its preliminary assessment
described above.").
205. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America at 2, Doe v. Zedillo,
No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2012) (No. 38).
206. Order to Show Cause at 2, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 25,
2012) (No. 39).
207. Order Dismissing Case at 6, Doe v. Zedillo, No. 3:11-cv-01433-AWT (D. Conn. July 18,
2013) (No. 83).
208. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh to Stuart F. Delery at 1, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba
at 1, No. 1:10-cv-05381-DLI-CLP (E.D.N.Y. Dec 17, 2012) (No. 35-1) [hereinafter Koh Letter on
Pasha/Taj]. The Statement included both an analysis determining immunity for the ISI under
the FSIA and an analysis determining immunity for the former Directors General under
common-law principles of conduct-based foreign official immunity. The same letter was filed with
the Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity in three other associated cases, Scherr v.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05382 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (No. 25); Chroman v. Lashkar-e-
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After Pakistan made a formal request for immunity,209 the
Department of State found that the complainant challenged "Pasha's
and Taj's exercise of their official powers as Directors General of the
ISI," thereby challenging the "exercise of their official powers as
officials of the Government of Pakistan."210 The State Department
asserted that "[o]n their face, acts of defendant foreign officials who
are sued for exercising the powers of their office are treated as acts
taken in an official capacity."211 Because the allegations of the
complaint were "bound up with plaintiffs' claims that the former
Directors General were in full command and control of the ISIS and
allegedly acted entirely within that official capacity," Pasha and Taj
were entitled to complete conduct-based foreign official immunity.212
While this Suggestion came on the immediate heels of the
Fourth Circuit's holding that courts should consider but not
completely defer to State Department determinations of conduct-based
immunity, the State Department still asserted that its determinations
in this area are in fact controlling on courts. The Suggestion argued
that "the common law governing foreign official immunity is a 'rule of
substantive law' requiring courts to 'accept and follow the executive
determination' concerning a foreign official's immunity from suit."213
Finally, the State Department attempted to reserve for the Executive
Branch the authority to determine whether particular acts were taken
in the official capacity of a foreign official: "it is for the Executive
Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the conduct alleged was
taken in a foreign official's official capacity."214
Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05448 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (No. 28); Ragsdale v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, No.
1:11-cv-03893 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (No. 19).
209. Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity at 10, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-
Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (No. 35) [hereinafter Pasha/Taj SOI].
210. Koh Letter on Pasha/Taj, supra note 208, at 1.
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Pasha/Taj SOI, supra note 209, at 8 (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 36 (1945)). The Suggestion cites the Second Circuit's determination "that separation of
powers requires courts to defer to the Executive Branch's determination regarding foreign official
immunity." Id. (citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009)). It also notes the Seventh
Circuit's observation "that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its
conduct of foreign affairs .. . by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Ye v. Zemin,
383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2004)).
214. Id. at 9-10 (citing Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 ("It is ... not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds
which the government has not seen fit to recognize.")).
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The plaintiffs and defendants filed responses to the Statement
for Pasha and Taj.215 The Eastern District of New York, citing Second
Circuit precedent, accepted the State Department's Statement as
conclusive and dismissed the claims against Pasha and Taj. 2 1 6
V. NEW RULES: A FRAMEWORK FOR COURTS MOVING FORWARD
Through its Suggestions and Statements, the State
Department has developed a consistent set of standards for
determining foreign official immunity in the post-Samantar age.
Accordingly, these standards provide a workable rubric for courts to
apply should the State Department remain silent on the question of
immunity in a particular case moving forward. Of course, it is unlikely
that the State Department will remain silent in cases involving head-
of-state immunity, given the prominence of leaders of foreign
nations. 217 However, for more routine cases, outgoing State
Department Legal Advisor Koh has made clear that "the more the
State Department establishes an official immunity policy over time,
the more silent we can afford to be in most cases." 218
A key element of foreign official immunity after Samantar is
the district court's ability to "decide for itself whether all the
requisites for such immunity exist[ I" should the State Department
215. See Plaintiffs' Response to the Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity,
Rosenberg v. Lashkar-E-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013) (No. 40) (arguing
Pasha and Taj should not receive statutory immunity until their alleged human rights violations
are investigated since individuals who violate internationally accepted jus cogens norms are not
entitled to foreign officer immunity); Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Response to the Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity, Rosenberg v.
Lashkar-E-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (No. 41) (arguing that despite
plaintiffs claim of alleged jus cogens norm violations, immunity should still apply because
plaintiff offers no explanation as to why the Court should treat the Department of State's
determination of immunity as a mere recommendation).
216. Opinion and Order at 10, 12, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,2013) (No. 43):
It is the position of the Executive Branch that defendants Pasha and Taj, former
Directors General of the ISI, are entitled to foreign sovereign immunity under the
common law as foreign officials who were sued in their official capacity for acts
conducted in their official capacity. Under the common law on sovereign immunity,
the Court's inquiry ends here.
(citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009)).
217. This was also the case in the pre-Samantar age of foreign official immunity
determinations. The State Department generally notified the district court and asserted
immunity as soon as it became aware of a case against a sitting head of state or foreign minister.
For lower-level officials, and by negative implication former high level officials, the Department
did not file suggestions of immunity unless requested by the court. Bellinger, supra note 99, at
823 n.17.
218. Koh, supra note 11, at 1161.
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remain silent in a particular case. 219 Thus, when determining an
official immunity question, the court should apply the same policies
that the State Department employs, which are best explained in those
Suggestions of Immunity and Statements of Interest that the
Department does issue.220 The State Department considers, for
example, whether the foreign government has requested a finding of
immunity, the current status of the official including his or her
residential status, and the nature of the acts involved.221 Providing
courts with a consistent framework to make their own independent
determinations of foreign official immunity will lessen the burden on
the State Department to submit suggestions in every case and make
judicial determinations more consistent and credible.222
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's most recent ruling in Yousuf v.
Samantar raised important questions about the appropriate level of
deference that courts should afford the State Department's foreign
official immunity determinations. 2 23 This Note agrees with the State
Department that the interests of foreign policy and comity counsel in
favor of absolute judicial deference to the State Department's
determinations of head-of-state immunity. However, determinations of
conduct-based official immunity should not receive absolute deference
from the courts. Instead, a rebuttable presumption of immunity
should attach in such cases, and the court should then invite the
parties to file responses on the propriety of the State Department's
immunity determination.
A. Judicial Determinations of Immunity
In either head-of-state or conduct-based immunity cases, a
court cannot award immunity to foreign officials unless their
government first requests it. Ultimately, under the principles of
customary international law, sovereign immunity belongs to the
foreign state, not the official.224 The immunity of the state is extended
219. Yousuf III, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
587 (1943)).
220. Id.
221. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the State Department's post-Samantar Suggestions of
Immunity for heads of state).
222. Overburdening the State Department with immunity requests was a primary concern
of Koh's immediate predecessor as Legal Advisor, John B. Bellinger. For a taste of Bellinger's
concerns about how the Samantar ruling would impact the workflow of the State Department,
see Bellinger, supra note 99, at 827-33.
223. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d 763, 772-73 (4th Cir. 2012).
224. See supra Part II.A (discussing immunity as a privilege of the state); Certain Questions
of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 177, 188 (June 4)
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to the official for the protection of the state itself, to keep foreign
courts from questioning, or even punishing, its official conduct, which
can only be performed through its government officials. Therefore, a
foreign state's decision to waive the immunity of its officials should be
conclusive.225 In all but three cases discussed above, foreign
governments expressly requested that the State Department
intervene in the proceedings and extend immunity to their officials. 226
The Samantar and Magan Statements of Interest recognized
this principle of state ownership of immunity. Both Statements
grounded the State Department's findings of no immunity in the fact
that Samantar and Magan were former officials of a state with no
recognized government that could request immunity on their behalf.227
The State Department therefore rightly refused to extend immunity
where no (recognized) government explicitly requested it for its foreign
officials. Likewise, since there is no foreign sovereign to be harmed as
a result of litigation involving its former officials, there is no need for
the extension of immunity to protect the sovereign. 228
However, the State Department also justified its decisions on
the grounds that both Samantar and Magan had become residents of
the United States and thus should be subject to the jurisdiction of
(determining that Djibouti's claim of functional immunity for their officials was essentially a
claim of immunity for the Djiboutian State); see also Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 61 (Feb. 14) (stating that officials do not have criminal immunity
in their own state and that they will cease to have criminal immunity in foreign jurisdictions if
their state waives it).
225. Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity: Invocation, Purpose, Exceptions, 23 SwIss R.
INT'L & EUR. L. 207, 214-15 (2013). It is important to note that an individual official's invocation
of immunity is insufficient to claim immunity protection because the immunity belongs
exclusively to the state and would allow an individual to avoid prosecution even "when the
facilitative values underlying immunity are not being served." Id. at 215. Moreover, the basis of
foreign official immunity lies in protecting an official from punishment for conduct that is only
properly attributable to the state, not the official himself. Id. at 215--16.
226. The only governments that did not request a finding of immunity on behalf of their
officials were Somalia and Yemen in the cases of Samantar, Magan, and President Ali Abdullah
Saleh. See supra Part IV.
227. Supra notes 78, 79, 166, 168 and accompanying text. This justification of the State
Department has been complicated due to recent foreign relations developments. On January 17,
2013, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced "that for the first time since 1991,
the United States is recognizing the government of Somalia." U.S. Dep't of State, Secretary
Clinton Delivers Remarks with President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, YOUTUBE (Jan.
17, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-HIUBFui-U-8 (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmI/2013/01/202998.htm). The government of Somalia has
requested immunity on behalf of Samantar. See John B. Bellinger III, Samantar Petitions for
Cert After Fourth Circuit Denial of Foreign Official Immunity for Alleged Jus Cogens Violations,
LAWFARE (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:24 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/samantar-petitions-for-
cert-after-fourth-circuit-denial-of-foreign-official-immunity-for-alleged-jus-cogens-violations/.
228. This is not to suggest that the United States would be able to "de-recognize" an
established, functioning government and thereby strip its officials of immunity protection.
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domestic courts-a novel justification in the official immunity
context. 229 This justification is seemingly at odds with state ownership
of immunity and could cause significant problems if a foreign
government asserted immunity on behalf of a former official who took
up residence in the United States.230 It is unclear, based on the
developing position of the State Department, whether the former
official under that scenario would be entitled to immunity. If the State
Department continues to consider U.S. residency in its immunity
determinations, it must consider whether former U.S. officials will
reciprocally be stripped of immunity should they decide to reside
abroad after leaving their positions.
When a court is considering immunity for a foreign head of
state, the determination is fairly clear cut. Because governments can
be structured in many different ways, courts should utilize
Restatement § 66 to identify if the foreign official before the court is
truly the head of state.231 If identification proves difficult, the court
should utilize the State Department to properly identify the official's
position. Once a head of state is identified, head-of-state immunity
should be afforded if the official is the current, sitting head of a foreign
state.232 The court should then dismiss the case or, in the alternative,
dismiss any motions to bring a head of state under the jurisdiction of
the court (e.g., for a deposition). Most importantly, the court should
not accept the State Department's silence as conclusive evidence that
a potential head of state is not entitled to immunity, so long as the
individual's position is confirmed. 233
Conduct-based immunity, on the other hand, requires courts to
perform a more nuanced balancing of various circumstances. As a
threshold matter, only actions taken in an official capacity are entitled
to conduct-based immunity, whether the individual is a current or
229. Supra notes 75, 166, and accompanying text.
230. Now that the recognized government of Somalia has requested immunity on behalf of
Samantar, we will potentially see how this scenario plays out.
231. See, e.g., Hassen v. Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106 DMG
(MANx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144819, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (discussing certain
titles of officials to which foreign immunity extends). United States courts would not be alone in
extending head-of-state immunity to a foreign minister. In 2002, the International Court of
Justice extended head-of-state immunity to Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, [ 54 (Feb. 14) (determining that head-of-state immunity applies to
a Minister of Foreign Affairs throughout the duration of his or her office).
232. See, e.g., Kagame SOI, supra note 122, at 6 (stating President Kagame enjoys head-of-
state immunity since he is the sitting head of a foreign state).
233. Contra Hassen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144819, at *16--17. Of course, the foreign state
must also assert immunity on behalf of its official.
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former official of the foreign government. 234 If the alleged actions were
taken in a personal or non-official capacity, then the former official is
not entitled to immunity regardless of the circumstances.
If the foreign government attests that the acts in question were
taken in an official capacity, its determination should be afforded a
strong presumption of correctness. 235 The same presumption should
attach if the law of the foreign nation characterizes the acts in
question as official in nature. 236 Without one of these indications,
courts should generally presume that actions taken by a foreign
official exercising the powers of his office were taken in an official
capacity, particularly if the actions were taken by a foreign head of
state while in office. 237 This is especially true when the foreign official
is being sued precisely for exercising the powers of their office. 238
Together, these factors create a strong presumption that the foreign
official was acting within the scope of his or her official capacity when
performing the alleged conduct and is therefore entitled to conduct-
based foreign official immunity.
B. Judicial Deference for State Department Suggestions of Immunity
Under the holding of the Fourth Circuit's most recent decision
in Samantar, head-of-state immunity determinations submitted by
the State Department are "entitled to absolute deference," 239 while
determinations regarding conduct-based immunity are not controlling
but "carr[y] substantial weight."240
For cases of head-of-state immunity, the Fourth Circuit's
holding seems to reflect the practice of the majority of district courts
which have dealt with such cases. Only the Southern District of New
York waffled on whether or not the State Department's suggestion of
head-of-state immunity controlled.241 However, the absolute deference
234. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, § 456, at 1043-44 (stating a
deposed or abdicated head of state enjoys continuing immunity only for his official acts after he
is out of the position).
235. Koh Letter on Zedillo, supra note 199, at 2.
236. See Koh Letter on Senesie/Sesay, supra note 194, at 3 (stating that "[a]lthough the
character of an act under the law of the foreign state is not the only relevant factor in making
immunity determinations," the defendants in this case are immune to the extent that the court
finds that their acts were taken in their official capacities under the law of the foreign state).
237. Koh Letter on Zedillo, supra note 199, at 1.
238. Id. at 1-2.
239. Yousuf V1, 699 F.3d 763, 772 (4th Cir. 2012).
240. Id. at 773.
241. See Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455 (ALC)(JCF), 2012 WL 3542209, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (agreeing that the State Department's Suggestion of Immunity results
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that courts afford to the State Department's determinations of head-
of-state immunity is rooted in the constitutional assignment of the
power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" to the
Executive Branch.242 The Fourth Circuit in Samantar noted that this
power "includes, by implication, the power to accredit diplomats and
recognize foreign heads of state."243 Absolute deference is proper for
determinations of head-of-state immunity because it involves the
"quintessentially executive function" of "a formal act of recognition."244
Moreover, it is a longstanding principle of customary international law
that a head of state is immune from suit in foreign jurisdictions while
in office. 245 The proper functioning of any government requires
constant attention from its head of state. Allowing a sitting head of
state to be drawn into litigation around the world distracts them from
running his or her country and could have serious reciprocal
implications for the U.S. President as well. Because the Executive
Branch is charged by the Constitution to be "the guiding organ in the
conduct of our foreign affairs,"246 and the Department of State is the
knowledge base of the Executive Branch regarding the status and
conduct of the nation's foreign affairs, suggestions by the Department
of head-of-state immunity should receive absolute deference from the
courts of the United States.
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, however, "there is no
equivalent constitutional basis suggesting that the views of the
Executive Branch control questions of foreign official immunity."247
The doctrine of foreign official immunity is derived from the sovereign
immunity traditionally afforded to foreign states. 248 Conduct-based
immunity attaches to actions by foreign officials because of the official
nature of such actions. 249 It is now a well-established principle of
international law, embraced by U.S. courts, that a foreign state's
in dismissal in this case but refusing to hold that the executive branch's determination of
immunity is binding and not subject to judicial review).
242. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
243. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d at 772.
244. Rutledge, supra note 93, at 606.
245. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, § 137, at 460 (stating that
international law gives every state a right to claim exemption from local jurisdiction for its head
of state).
246. Magan Statement, supra note 161, at 3 (quoting Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173
(1948)).
247. Yousuf V7, 699 F.3d at 773.
248. HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008).
249. Chim&ne I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 704, 709 (2012).
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sovereign immunity "extends to an individual official acting on behalf
of that foreign state."250
It is instructive that the Executive Branch has shifted its
position on the level of deference that courts should afford to its
suggestions on conduct-based immunity. At the time of the U.S.'s
founding, foreign officials were considered to be "on the same 'footing'
with 'every other foreigner' who came within" the territory of the
United States. 251 Therefore, conduct-based immunity offered no
protection for foreign officials, and the Executive Branch did not
believe that it had "constitutional authority to instruct a court to
dismiss a private suit on conduct-based immunity grounds," even for
current officials. 252 The Executive Branch set a precedent in the
eighteenth century of leaving the determination of conduct-based
immunity to the assessment of the courts.253
Judicial deference to Executive Branch suggestions of
immunity did not become routine until the 1930s, in the context of
title proceedings against foreign ships.254 Today, the State
Department considers the Supreme Court's decisions in Ex parte Peru
and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman as definitive evidence that courts
must afford absolute deference to its conduct-based immunity
determinations. The Department cites the principles of separation of
powers and urges the courts not to "embarrass" the United States in
the foreign policy arena by contradicting the branch charged with
maintaining the nation's international affairs.255
The State Department's point is well-taken. While courts are
certainly capable of deciding questions of foreign official immunity and
even the potential foreign policy implications of their decisions, the
State Department is simply in a better position to make these
250. Yousuf VI, 699 F.3d at 774 (emphasis in original). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 66(f) (1965) ("The immunity of a foreign state ... extends
to . . . any . .. public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his
official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the
state.").
251. Keitner, supra note 249, at 709-10.
252. Id. at 710.
253. See id. at 758 (explaining that the Executive believed that certain types "of
intervention in a civil suit against a foreign official would be constitutionally prohibited").
254. Id. at 759. See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945) (dealing
with in rem possession of a foreign ship and asserting that courts must defer to executive branch
suggestions of immunity when submitted); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89
(1943) (like Hoffman, dealing with in rem possession of a ship and asserting courts must defer to
executive branch suggestions of immunity).
255. See supra note 213 (discussing a Suggestion of Immunity in which the Department
notes a Seventh Circuit observation that the courts should not act in a way that embarrasses the
executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs).
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determinations. The State Department is the locus of expertise on
foreign affairs and can provide the most up-to-date information on the
state of the world and the implications of submitting a foreign official,
current or former, to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Courts should take
advantage of the State Department instead of trying to conduct these
delicate international investigations itself. Moreover, foreign states
will naturally expect to deal with the State Department when matters
of official immunity are concerned and submit their requests for
determinations of immunity to the State Department.
While the State Department may be overstepping in claiming
that its conduct-based immunity Suggestions are entitled to absolute
deference, the Fourth Circuit's determination that its Suggestions
should only carry substantial weight also misses the mark. Instead,
the best approach likely lies somewhere in the middle. If the State
Department submits a Suggestion finding conduct-based immunity,
that Suggestion should create a rebuttable presumption of immunity
for the foreign official. The case would then proceed in a similar
fashion to the current case of former President Zedillo. The court
would issue an order for the plaintiffs to show cause why the
immunity should not be upheld. The defendant foreign official would
then have an opportunity to reply to the plaintiffs submission, and
the court would ultimately decide whether or not the presumption of
immunity has been rebutted.
In a case where the State Department submits a determination
that the foreign official is not entitled to conduct-based immunity, the
process would work the same. The official would then have the
opportunity to show cause why the court should not adopt the
determination by demonstrating that he or she acted within the scope
of his or her official capacity. This approach provides the proper level
of deference to the State Department's expertise while still allowing
the parties to present extenuating evidence of why the determination
may be unjust. As long as the State Department acts reasonably in its
determinations, grounding them in a close examination of the facts
and careful consideration of the relevant law, courts should conclude
that the initial presumption of immunity afforded to the State
Department should be the controlling determination in the case.256
VI. STATE OF PLAY: CONCLUSION
The Samantar decision ushered in a return to the pre-FSIA
two-step process utilized in cases requiring a determination of head-of-
256. Koh, supra note 11, at 1161.
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state or conduct-based official immunity for foreign officials. In the
years following that decision, the State Department has penned eleven
Suggestions of Immunity or Statements of Interest expounding on
whether sitting and former heads of state and other foreign officials
were entitled to immunity.257 The State Department has chosen not to
issue a general statement of principles articulating its view on these
immunities-a veritable "Koh Letter."258 However, these Suggestions
and Statements provide courts with relatively clear, well-developed
factors to consider when faced with determining the immunity
entitlement of a head of state or foreign official in the face of State
Department silence.
These factors can be summarized as follows. First, immunity
should only be extended to an official if the relevant foreign state
formally requests it.259 Once the foreign state makes a formal request
for immunity, courts should consider the type of official in question. In
the case of a head of state, immunity should be extended once the
court confirms that the individual is in fact the current, sitting head of
state.260 For other foreign officials, the court should extend immunity
only for acts taken in their official capacity, as determined by the
foreign state's assertions, the law of the foreign nation, and the basic
nature of the acts involved. 261
Furthermore, if the State Department weighs in, courts should
afford the Department's determination a certain amount of deference,
depending on the type of official in question. For head-of-state
immunity, the court should accord absolute judicial deference to the
State Department's determination of immunity.262 In cases of conduct-
based immunity, the State Department's grant or refusal of immunity
should be afforded a rebuttable presumption of correctness. 263 As long
as the State Department's determination is reasonably grounded in
principles of customary international law, courts should defer to the
Executive Branch's expertise. In this way, both the Executive and
Judicial branches will contribute to the development of consistent
257. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing post-Samantar cases where the State
Department submitted Suggestions of Immunity).
258. See Bellinger, supra note 99, at 829 (recommending that the State Department issue
just such a general statement of principles comparable to the Tate Letter of 1952).
259. See discussion supra Part V.A (asserting that since immunity belongs to the foreign
state, not the foreign official, the foreign state's invocation or waiver of immunity on behalf of its
official should be conclusive).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See discussion supra Part V.B (discussing the holding in Samantar that State
Department determinations of head-of-state immunity are entitled to absolute deference).
263. Id.
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rules for official immunity in the United States, ensuring that foreign
states will not be laid bare to litigation due to the conduct of their
officials. In turn, the consistent enforcement of immunity in the
United States will help protect our own officials abroad.
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